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Abstract
We analyze diﬀerences in tax ﬁling between natives and immigrants, focusing on
two empirical examples. First, we study deductions for costs associated with traveling
between home and work allowed in the Swedish tax code. Using the total population
of commuters within Sweden’s largest commuting zone, we ﬁnd that newly arrived
immigrants ﬁle substantially less than natives, immigrants with a longer stay behave
more like natives, and immigrants with the longest stay ﬁle the most, even more than
natives. Second, we analyze bunching behavior among the self-employed at a large
salient kink point of the Swedish income tax schedule. We ﬁnd much less bunching
among immigrants, even after a long time in the host country, and the largest dif-
ferences relative to natives in residential areas with a high immigrant concentration.
Our ﬁndings have implications for the equity and eﬃciency of the tax system and the
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1 Introduction
In light of increasing globalization and labor mobility, as well as recent waves of migration in
Europe, the question of how immigrants interact with the tax systems of their host countries
and how they access the beneﬁts of modern welfare states has gained increased relevance. A
basic insight is that if, in the government’s quest for an equitable and eﬃcient tax system,
the tax system becomes too complex and relies too much on the active participation of the
taxpayer to correctly provide information to the tax authority, this can result in tax burdens
being unequally distributed among individuals with equal economic circumstances. This can
lead to unintended welfare consequences, create distortions in economic behavior, and imply
that the tax system is viewed as unfair or discriminatory, ultimately aﬀecting its legitimacy.1
As knowledge about tax systems is likely to be transmitted within ethnic networks,
across generations and through social interactions with experienced (native) tax ﬁlers, tax
complexity is prone to particularly aﬀect immigrants. Given the relevance of the tax system
in most areas of economic life, this has consequences for a range of diverse aspects such as the
eﬃciency of labor markets, cross-country migration incentives, social and spatial mobility,
integration, and residential segregation.
In this paper, we document diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behavior between natives and immi-
grants using population-wide administrative data and two speciﬁc empirical examples. First,
we consider one of the largest Swedish commuting zones, the Stockholm–Uppsala region, and
compare how observationally identical natives and immigrants diﬀer with respect to if and
how they ﬁle for the deduction for commuting cost that is allowed in the Swedish tax code.2
This commuting deduction, which is the most common deduction in Sweden, implies a re-
duction in yearly taxable income by an amount equal to the part of an individual’s annual
expenses for traveling between home and work that exceeds a certain threshold (around
$1000) provided certain eligibility criteria are satisﬁed.3 Second, we study to which extent
self-employed natives and immigrants bunch at the largest and most salient kink point of
the Swedish personal income tax schedule. This kink is located in the upper middle part of
1A widely acknowledged principle in the design of tax systems is that the government should provide
a ﬁscally equal treatment of “equals”. This is not a ﬁrmly rooted normative principle, but rather a legal
principle or political constraint that is understood as being crucial for the long-term stability and legitimacy
of the tax system.
2Commuting deductions are common in Western European countries, including the Nordic countries, Ger-
many, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, but do not exist in important
economies outside Europe such as the US, Canada, UK and China (see, e.g., Potter et al. 2006 and Paetzold
and Winner 2016).
3For example, if commuting by car, the time saving must be at least two hours per working day relative to
using public transport. Notice that the deduction implies that the commuting cost (exceeding the threshold)
is subsidized at a rate which depends on the individual’s personal marginal tax rate.
the income distribution, where the marginal tax rate jumps by around 20 percentage points.
We use both traditional (unconditional) bunching estimation as well as multivariate regres-
sions where the outcome variable is a dummy indicating whether an individual locates at the
kink. Our analysis exploits geographical information about residence and workplace, and
the data allows us to diﬀerentiate immigrants by the time since arrival in the host country,
by their region of origin, and the level of segregation at their residential location. We also
complement our study examining diﬀerences in tax compliance for the total population.
Our main ﬁnding is that there are striking diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behavior between
natives and immigrants, but also some noteworthy exceptions. Newly arrived immigrant
commuters have a substantially lower take-up of the commuting deduction than natives.
Immigrants seem to learn over time, and those with a longer stay in Sweden are even more
likely to ﬁle deductions than natives. Moreover, our bunching analysis reveals that self-
employed immigrants are substantially less likely to bunch at the kink, even after several
decades in the host country, a result mainly driven by non-European immigrants, and those
who live in areas with a high immigrant concentration. Our analysis of tax compliance
reveals that immigrants are more likely to miss the declaration deadline and to be ﬁned for
non-compliance, regardless of their length of stay in the country. An exception is low-income
immigrants whose behavior is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of natives. Immigrants
are also less likely to actively participate in the tax declaration process (through the ﬁling
of deductions etc.), but most of this gap closes over time.
The general purpose of our analysis is to highlight the eﬀects of tax complexity in eth-
nically diverse populations, revealing factors that policymakers need to take into account
when assessing the eﬃciency and equity properties of the tax system. However, the diﬀer-
ences in take-up that we document also have important implications for the spatial patterns
in urban labor markets. For example, in the context of our commuting deduction analysis,
the lower take-up of commuting deductions among immigrants is likely to aﬀect the geo-
graphic scope of the area in which they search for work (see e.g., Le Gallo et al. 2017),
with implications for residential patterns, the formation of ethnic enclaves, urban sprawl
and the quality of employer-employee matching. Moreover, the bunching evidence tells us
that knowledge about how to engage in (legal) tax planning and tax minimization is very
diﬀerent for natives and immigrants, and suggests that those who reside in areas with a
high concentration of immigrants suﬀer the greatest informational disadvantage. This has
implications for the decision to become self-employed, and ultimately aﬀects the economic
mobility and integration of immigrants. More generally, our results suggest that the spa-
tial allocation of immigrants can have important implications for occupational choices by
aﬀecting the diﬀusion of knowledge about the incentives inherent in the tax system.
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Our paper contributes to the very active research literature on how individuals respond
to tax complexity and the monetary incentives inherent in the tax system. This literature,
which is surveyed in detail below, is increasingly highlighting that taxpayers do not perfectly
optimize their behavior in relation to the tax system. However, there is not much empiri-
cal evidence showing which groups of the population are most likely characterized by such
imperfect optimization and whether the eﬀects are quantitatively signiﬁcant. In this paper,
we seek to ﬁll this gap. Tax rules that are attractive on theoretical grounds might not work
in practice if certain groups of taxpayers fail to respond to the implied incentives or if there
are compliance and take-up costs that the policymaker did not anticipate.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we survey the related literature.
In sections 3 and 4 we look separately at the two examples of the commuting deduction
and the bunching at the kink of self-employed. Section 5 presents additional results on
tax compliance behavior. Finally, we provide concluding remarks. The Appendices A – C
provide additional information and empirical results.
2 Related literature
Our ﬁrst empirical example looks at the Swedish commuting deduction. To the best of
our knowledge, there is not much work on deduction behavior in general, and commuting
deductions in particular. The reason for this is most likely the need for large and detailed
administrative data sets. Two exceptions are Paetzold and Winner (2016) and Frimmel et al.
(2018), who study commuting and other deductions from a diﬀerent angle than ours, focusing
on the tax evasion aspect. There is however a large related literature that looks at the take-
up of various social beneﬁts. Bargain et al. (2012) show for Finnish data that 40-50% of
eligible individuals do not claim social beneﬁts. Bhargava and Manoli (2015) state that the
typical EITC non-claimant forgoes an estimated $1,096.4 In comparison to this literature,
we examine tax ﬁling behavior and focus on higher income groups of the population.
The commuting deduction analysis relates to the urban economics literature that has
examined the eﬀects of commuting costs on a range of diﬀerent outcomes. For example,
Black et al. (2014) emphasize that commuting distance, and related costs, have a dispro-
portionate negative eﬀect on female labor force participation. Le Gallo et al. (2017) show
in a large controlled experiment in France that reduced commuting costs have a positive
eﬀect on the job search activity of younger individuals. Hensen et al. (2009) establish that
4The literature provides several explanations for the lack of take-up, such as insuﬃcient awareness (Chetty
and Saez 2013) and the way information is presented (Saez 2009). The literature has also emphasized the
importance of social image concerns, such as stigma costs (e.g., Friedrichsen et al. 2018)
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enhanced geographic mobility positively aﬀects the quality of education-job matches using
data from the Netherlands. Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010) show using
German data that those with longer commutes have higher labor supply, arguing that this is
a plausible outcome when workers have the option to vary both the number of hours worked
per day and the number of workdays.5 More broadly, there is a large literature studying the
eﬀects of spatial aspects such as agglomeration and the quality and availability of transport
infrastructure, on outcomes such as the geographical pattern of suburbanization, commut-
ing behavior, employment and house prices (see, e.g., De la Roca 2017, Baum-Snow and
Kahn 2000, Rosenthal and Strange 2008, Garcia-López 2012, Garcia-López et al. 2015, and
Mayer and Trevien 2017). There is also a literature on spatial mismatch which argues that
geographical distance is a barrier to accessing available jobs. This mechanism is thought to
especially aﬀect ethnic minorities (see, e.g., Gabriel and Rosenthal 1996, Boustan and Margo
2009, Zenou 2013). The heterogeneity in the take-up of commuting deductions between dif-
ferent ethnic groups that we document also adds a new angle to studies of the distributional
eﬀects of commuter subsidies (see Heuermann et al. 2017 for a recent contribution).
Our second empirical example, the bunching analysis, highlights the role of ethnic seg-
regation in explaining how the self-employed react to the incentives in the tax system. It
therefore relates to a branch of the literature studying the role of social interaction for eco-
nomic behavior, emphasizing information transmission, spatial interactions and spill-over
eﬀects, and is connected to a research agenda examining spatial aspects of entrepreneurship
(see Glaeser et al. 2010).6 Chetty et al. (2013) use “sharp” bunching behavior among the
self-employed as a proxy for local knowledge about tax rules and ﬁnd that individuals who
move from low to high bunching regions appear to optimize better after they move (in the
sense of reporting incomes that to a greater extent maximize their EITC refund). Bezin
and Moizeau (2017) study the relationship between cultural dynamics, urban segregation
and inequality and discuss the costs and beneﬁts of living in ethnically segregated areas.
Drago et al. (2019) show by example of the Austrian TV license fee that information about
5See also Paetzold (2019a) who ﬁnds a positive relationship between the generosity of commuting subsidies
and commuting distance.
6The bunching analysis also relates to the rapidly growing literature that uses bunching evidence to
measure behavioral responses. See Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011), and Bastani and Selin (2014). Many
bunching studies focus, in similarity to our study, on the self-employed as the self-employed can more easily
adjust their income through tax ﬁling or labor supply adjustment as compared to wage-earners. They are
also less constrained by third-party reporting, work hours constraints and have better access to professional
tax planning. Indeed, the behavior of these groups have been shown to be very diﬀerent from that of
wage earners (Bastani and Selin 2014, Paetzold 2019b). Some studies document ’neoclassical’ responses to
monetary bunching incentives (e.g., Buhlmann et al. 2018, Doerrenberg et al. 2017, Paetzold 2019b), while
other studies document behavior that does not conform with standard models. For example, Engström et al.
(2015) and Engström et al. (2018) show that the decision to ﬁle for deductions causally depends on whether
taxpayers have an initial deﬁcit or credit with the tax authority, indicating the importance of loss aversion.
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letters to potential evaders spread and raise compliance within neighborhood networks in
Austria. Also using Austrian data, in the context of commuting deductions, Paetzold and
Winner (2016) ﬁnd that tax evasion behavior changes when people move between work-
places, indicating the importance of the workplace as a domain of information transmission,
and Frimmel et al. (2018) provide evidence of the inter-generational spill-over of tax evasion
behavior.7
Both our empirical examples relate to the literature analyzing the eﬀects of complexity
and salience of tax rules on taxpayer behavior. These issues have recently been analyzed
from theoretical and empirical perspectives by Chetty et al. (2009), Abeler and Jäger (2015),
Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2018), and Blumkin et al. (2019). The literature generally sup-
ports the idea that taxpayers respond to tax incentives, but there is an increasing awareness
of the need for reﬁned theories in order to explain observed behavior.8 Hoopes et al. (2015)
analyze taxpayers’ search for information (using phone calls to the IRS and internet search
data) and show that they actively get informed in order to comply with tax law. However,
there is also the possibility of widespread misunderstanding of tax legislation, as highlighted
by Feldman et al. (2016). Benzarti (2017) shows that taxpayers rationally forgo tax savings
in order to save on compliance costs, and that such behavior is more prevalent among high-
income earners, consistent with the idea that they have higher opportunity costs of time.
Moreover, Aghion et al. (2018) examine how French self-employed respond to tax complexity
and discuss the determinants of taxpayer learning, ﬁnding that individuals value simplicity,
leave money on the table, learn over time and that complexity costs are more likely to aﬀect
individuals who are less educated or have lower income.9
A relevant question in our setting is what can be done to mitigate low take-up in the
7Other papers are Bohne et al. (2018), who document information spread through the labor mobility of
managers and tax experts, Alstadsæter et al. (2018) who show how tax avoidance spreads within family
networks, and Alstadsæter and Jacob (2017) who document how information about tax avoidance opportu-
nities spreads in local communities. In the context of welfare programs, Bertrand et al. (2000) examine social
network eﬀects in welfare take-up. They ﬁnd that interacting with people who speak one’s own language
increases welfare take-up in local networks with high welfare take-up. See also Hansen and Lofstrom (2003)
for an important early contribution on the welfare take-up among immigrants in Sweden.
8See Bernheim and Taubinsky (2018) for an overview of the emerging ﬁeld of behavioral public economics.
Behavioral biases that are mentioned in the literature include inattention (e.g., Hoopes et al. 2015), self-
control problems and incorrect beliefs (Allcott et al. 2019), and present bias (Lockwood 2017).
9Edmark and Gordon (2013) present evidence showing that high-income households respond to their
relatively stronger incentives to incorporate their business. There is also a large related literature on tax
morale, tax compliance and tax evasion. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) provided an early framework for
thinking about tax evasion as a rational decision and the literature is surveyed by Slemrod (2007). The role
of tax morale is analyzed in-depth by Luttmer and Singhal 2014. Recent papers using Scandinavian data are
Engström and Holmlund (2009) who show that unincorporated self-employed who face less public scrutiny
tend to under-report income to a larger extent than incorporated self-employed individuals in Sweden, and
Kleven et al. 2011 who ﬁnd that cheating on self-reported income components in Denmark is widespread
and that threat-of-audit letters have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the reporting of these income components.
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population, and there are some papers that have studied to which extent compliance frictions
can be remedied by tax authorities. Mascagni (2018) is a recent survey on tax experiments,
documenting a range of measures that have been tested for their eﬀectiveness in raising
compliance.10 Bhargava and Manoli (2015) report that complexity, salience and accuracy
of beliefs can be successfully changed through intervention, whereas perceived stigma costs
seem harder to aﬀect. They also cite language barriers as a reason for lower take-up, which
is related to the focus of our study. Guyton et al. (2016) and Manoli and Turner (2014)
show that sending reminders can aﬀect EITC take-up, especially among low-income ﬁlers.
However, repeated reminders may be necessary for long-term eﬀects. At the same time,
Chetty and Saez (2013) caution that information provision alone might not be suﬃcient
to have a signiﬁcant average eﬀect in the total population. Finally, Ramnath and Tong
(2017) show that temporary policies (a one-time stimulus payment) can induce ﬁrst-time
tax ﬁling with beneﬁcial long-term eﬀects for taxpayers, including continued tax ﬁling and
higher wages.
3 Case 1: The commuting deduction
In our ﬁrst empirical example we analyze how natives and immigrants respond diﬀerently to
the tax system in terms of ﬁling for commuting deductions. Commuting deductions are stan-
dard elements in the tax systems of many European countries (such as the Nordic countries,
Germany and France) but notably do not exist in countries such as the US, Canada and
the UK. The purpose of commuting deductions is to compensate individuals for their diﬀer-
ent costs of earning income related to their expenses for traveling between their home and
workplace. One important purpose of the commuting deduction is to incentivize individuals
to search for and accept employment in a larger geographical area, thereby increasing labor
market eﬃciency and positively impacting an individual’s career and earnings prospects.
However, as such deductions require the taxpayer to actively inform the tax authority about
their travel expenses, this will create heterogeneous take-up in the population, which has
distributional and fairness consequences. In particular, it can create unmotivated diﬀerences
in tax burden between less informed groups of the population and more informed groups of
the population.
10See also Robles (2009) and Fjeldstad and Heggstad (2012) who discuss, respectively, tax education
policies in US states with high immigrant concentration, and in African countries that try to build a taxpayer
culture.
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3.1 Details on the commuting deduction
As part of their annual tax declaration, Swedish income earners have the option of declaring
their previous year’s commuting cost. This can be done online or on paper.11 This declaration
results in an automatic reduction of income tax for an amount that is a function of the part
of the commuting cost that strictly exceeds the respective year’s eligibility threshold. The
threshold was SEK 7k in 2002–2006, SEK 8k in 2007–2008, SEK 9k in 2009–2011, and SEK
10k in 2012–2013. Notice that the deduction results in a reduction of taxable income for the
amount exceeding the threshold, and therefore implies an eﬀective subsidy to commuting
costs with a rate depending on an individual’s personal marginal income tax rate. The
commuting deduction is the most common tax deduction in Sweden (Skatteverket 2018).
Figure 1: The commuting deduction in the Swedish tax declaration form (illustration)
The tax declaration form contains a ﬁeld for the deduction, see Figure 1. The instructions
on the left can be translated as “Travel to and from work. You receive a deduction only for
the part exceeding SEK 10 000. Fill in the total amount.” Taxpayers do not have to take
any action if they do not want to declare a commuting cost. In particular, they do not have
to explicitly ﬁle a ‘zero’ commuting cost. Whenever a taxpayer does not exercise the option
of declaring a commuting cost, this shows up as zero commuting cost in the data. Thus,
when we discuss ‘zero ﬁling’ below, this should be understood as ‘no action has been taken’
by the taxpayer regarding the commuting deduction. In the tax declaration, it is feasible to
declare a commuting cost that is lower than the eligibility threshold. This has no apparent
beneﬁt for the taxpayer, and we refer to this as ﬁling ‘in the dominated region’.
The Swedish popular press regularly informs about tax deduction rules and common
mistakes. According to a recent article (Aftonbladet.se 2018), there is widespread ignorance
of the eligibility criteria among Swedish taxpayers. The tax authority in its press releases
attempts to highlight the rules as well. From 2018, the tax authority provides an online tool
that helps determine eligibility for the commuting deduction (Skatteverket 2018). According
to the tax authority, nearly one million Swedish taxpayers declare commuting deductions,
but about half of those taxpayers make some form of mistake or are not eligible at all. The
11In contrast to many other countries, Swedish taxpayers do not usually use specialized software to prepare
their tax declaration. Such software would typically alert them to potential deductions and eligibility criteria.
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most common mistake is to declare cost of commuting by car without fulﬁlling the eligibility
criterion of a minimum two-hour time saving (per round trip) vis-a-vis public transport
(Skatteverket 2018).12 An additional eligibility criteria is that the distance between home
and work must be suﬃciently large, and deductions for expenses using public transport are
only granted for the cheapest mode of transportation (hence, it is not possible to reach
eligibility threshold by e.g. purchasing ﬁrst class train tickets).13
In this paper, we focus on commuters between the Stockholm and Uppsala municipali-
ties.14 We do this for two reasons. First, this commuting region comprises one of the largest
commuting ﬂows in Sweden. Stockholm is Sweden’s largest and Uppsala its fourth-largest
city. Second, the geographical distance of about 70 km between these municipalities ensures
eligibility for the commuting deduction if the commuter uses public transportation. The
commuter trains between Stockholm and Uppsala are very well-developed. A single journey
from Uppsala center to Stockholm city center takes between 30 and 50 minutes, depending
on train operator and departure. If we take 2018 as a recent illustrative example, the eli-
gibility threshold for the commuting deduction was a total commuting cost of SEK 11,000
(≈ 1100 USD) and a round journey by train between Uppsala and Stockholm cost around
SEK 250. A 30-day discounted ticket cost around SEK 1 700 in 2018. Thus, a commuter
would reach eligibility after 45 round trips under the single journey ticket or after 7 months
under the 30-day ticket.15
3.2 Data
We use population-wide register data from Statistics Sweden covering the years 2002–2013.16
The data allows us to identify individuals’ municipalities of residence and their workplace
location. The workplace information identiﬁes the actual physical place of work (rather than
the head oﬃce of the ﬁrm). We deﬁne an individual as a commuter if the municipalities
of residence and workplace diﬀer, and identify people who live in Uppsala and work in
12Taxpayers are required to save their receipts and the tax agency regularly performs audits on a subset of
tax ﬁlers, requiring them to submit supporting documentation to the tax authority (such as receipts). The
exact nature of these audits is not known, since details about auditing procedures are not typically conveyed
by tax authorities to the public.
13The minimum distance requirement is always satisﬁed in our empirical examples.
14In the Tables A14 and A15 of Appendix A, we provide results for two other major commuting regions
(Södertälje–Stockolm and Kungsbacka–Gothenburg) that are, however, geographically more compact and
hence eligibility for the commuting deduction is less convincing that in our major example. The results are
in line with the ﬁndings for the Stockholm–Uppsala region.
15It is also possible to travel to and from work by car and deduct the associated expenses. However, as
already mentioned, here an additional eligibility rule applies requiring the commuter to save at least two
hours of commuting time relative to public transportation. In our empirical application, very few individuals
would be eligible for deductions for this mode of travel.
16The occupation data is available for this period only.
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Stockholm or the other way round. This population data is linked with individuals’ tax
records. These contain the individuals’ self-reported amount of commuting cost that has
been declared in a given year’s tax declaration. In this paper, we deﬁne an individual as
taking up the commuting deduction if the self-reported traveling cost is (strictly) above the
oﬃcial threshold of the tax authority (Skatteverket) for the given tax year.
We restrict the sample to the working age population between age 20 and 64. Fur-
thermore, to focus on individuals with a strong attachment to the labor market, we restrict
ourselves to individuals who have an annual wage income above SEK 150k (in 2013 prices).17
We deﬁne natives as those born in Sweden and immigrants as all foreign-born individuals
in the sample. The ﬁnal sample contains 68 707 observations for natives and 9 152 for
immigrants. The register data contains information about immigrants’ birth region (not
birth country) and their year of arrival in Sweden. Based on the available birth region data,
we classify immigrants as either Non-European immigrants, European immigrants (excluding
the Nordic countries) or Nordic immigrants.18 Based on the information about year of arrival,
we group each immigrant into one of three groups for each data year: arrived in Sweden less
than 5 years ago, between 5 and 10 years ago, and more than 10 years ago. Furthermore,
by interacting the region of birth with the time since arrival in the host country, we create
9 immigrant-cohort groups, as shown in Table 1. The majority of immigrant commuters
have stayed in Sweden for more than 10 years, comprising about 74 percent of immigrant
observations. In contrast, only about 14 percent of immigrants have been residing in Sweden
for less than 5 years.
17We have studied the sensitivity of our regression results with respect to the speciﬁcation of this threshold,
and the results appear robust. The corresponding regression results are shown in Tables A4 and A5 in
Appendix A. Moreover, the workplace information is based on November data. It is conceivable that people
switch jobs or workplaces within a year which can aﬀect the eligibility for the commuting deduction. To
address this issue, we show in Table A3 in Appendix A the regression results only for those commuters who
work in the same workplace for two consecutive years.
18Due to restrictions imposed by Statistics Sweden, the relatively small group of immigrants from the US,
Canada and Oceania countries are all classiﬁed as Western European immigrants, and, thus, are included in
our group of European immigrants. We have also looked at an alternative geographical classiﬁcations based
on the similarity of the respective countries’ taxation systems, in which we classify immigrants as either
Nordic immigrants, Western European immigrants or ‘other’ immigrants. The corresponding results are
shown in Tables A7 – A11 in Appendix A. The results suggest that recently arrived non-Nordic immigrants
are less likely than natives to take up the deduction. Furthermore, recently arrived Nordic and Western
European immigrants are more likely than natives to ﬁle in the dominated region.
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Table 1: The composition of immigrants in the sample
All immigrants Nordic European Non-European
percent percent percent percent
Length of stay ≤5 yrs 13.92 11.31 20.21 9.77
Length of stay 5−10 yrs 12.27 10.12 16.95 9.26
Length of stay >10 yrs 73.81 78.57 62.85 80.97
Observations 9 152 1 591 3 405 4 156
In Table 2 we show the age composition of native and immigrant commuters depending
on their length of stay in the host country. We see that there are few age diﬀerences between
immigrants with diﬀerent origin, but immigrants who are more recently arrived tend to be
younger.
Table 2: The average age in diﬀerent population groups
All immigrants Nordic European Non-European
Length of stay ≤5 yrs 34.38 34.14 34.43 34.40
(7.78) (7.44) (7.27) (8.72)
Length of stay 5−10 yrs 37.56 35.52 37.92 37.88
(7.85) (7.59) (7.08) (8.87)
Length of stay >10 yrs 43.32 48.08 45.19 40.33
(10.86) (9.62) (10.43) (10.67)
Observations 9 152 1 591 3 405 4 156
Standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 3 shows the occupation distribution. As we can see, most of the native and immi-
grant commuters are working in highly skilled occupations.
Table 3: The occupation distribution among commuters
Native commuters Immigrant commuters
Percent Percent
Legislators, senior oﬃcials and managers 11.46 6.55
Professionals 49.91 50.48
Technicians and associate professionals 22.31 20.09
Clerks 5.26 5.79
Service workers and shop sales workers 5.25 8.45
Skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers 0.09 0.08
Craft and related trade workers 3.05 3.25
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 1.64 1.99
Elementary occupations 1.03 3.33
Total 100.00 100.00
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Table 4: Summary statistics for the outcome and control variables
Native commuters Immigrant commuters
Mean SD Mean SD
Deduction 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.48
Age 41.16 11.19 41.36 10.70
Married 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.50
Primary School 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
Secondary School 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40
University 0.75 0.43 0.77 0.42
Female 0.35 0.48 0.39 0.49
Earned taxable labor income (SEK 1k) 487.56 396.49 420.10 245.16
Uppsala 0.80 0.41 0.74 0.44
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the main outcome variable and our control vari-
ables. The binary outcome variable Deduction in Table 4 measures whether the ﬁled cost
is strictly above the eligibility threshold or not. On average, 64 percent of commuters ﬁle
some amount of commuting cost above the threshold and the mean value is very similar
between native and immigrant commuters. However, as we will see below, these ﬁgures con-
tain interesting heterogeneity. Importantly, as evident from Table 4, natives and immigrants
in the sample are very similar in terms of background characteristics and the majority of
commuters in the sample are highly educated. The share of university-educated commuters
is about 75, resp. 77, percent for natives, resp. immigrants. The share of female commuters
is 35, resp. 39, percent among natives, resp. immigrants. They also tend to have a similar
regional commuting pattern. As indicated by the dummy variable Uppsala, about 80 and
74 percent of natives and immigrants, respectively, are living in Uppsala and commute to
Stockholm. The remaining commuters travel in the other direction. The only noteworthy
diﬀerence is that native commuters have higher taxable earnings than immigrant commuters.
In the sample, 50 782 natives (74 %) and 6 653 immigrants (73%) ﬁle a strictly positive
commuting cost. Figure 2 shows the distribution of declared commuting cost by native and
immigrant commuters. It contains four panels, one for each of the four periods in which the
threshold was constant (as mentioned in section 3.1, the threshold was SEK 7k 2002–2006,
SEK 8k 2007–2008, SEK 9k 2009–2011, and SEK 10k 2012–2013). We ﬁnd that a substantial
fraction of commuters declare commuting costs in the ‘dominated region’, i.e., above zero
but below the eligibility threshold. However, most of the non-zero declarations are above
the threshold. The majority of the ﬁled costs fall in the interval above the threshold and
below SEK 50k. There are some outliers who ﬁle very large amounts, but we are not able
to verify whether these are mistakes or represent cheating.19
19Notice that, unless there is an audit, the ﬁled amount is accepted by the tax authority. Our results are
robust to excluding individuals with claimed deductions of more than SEK 50k.
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Figure 2: The distribution of declared commuting cost (in SEK 1 000) across native and
immigrant commuters (deduction threshold marked by a vertical line)
0
.00
00
2.0
00
04
.00
00
6.0
00
08
De
ns
ity
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 150
Natives Immigrants
2002-2006
0
.00
00
2
.00
00
4
.00
00
6
De
ns
ity
0 40 60 80 100 120 14020
Natives Immigrants
2007-2008
0
.00
00
2
.00
00
4
.00
00
6
De
ns
ity
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140150
Natives Immigrants
2009-2011
0
.00
00
2
.00
00
4
.00
00
6
De
ns
ity
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140150
Natives Immigrants
2012-2013
13
Finally, we show a descriptive graph showing the average take-up depending on age,
ethnicity and duration of stay in the host country (see Figure 3). Here we see that there is
a clear age gradient in the take-up for natives and immigrants who have stayed in the host
country for a long time, but less so for more recently arrived immigrants.
Figure 3: The average take-up of the commuting deduction based on ethnicity, age, and
length of stay in the host country (raw averages).
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3.3 Results
We now go beyond the purely descriptive analysis and run multivariate regressions where we
can control for a rich set of covariates, enabling us to compare the take-up behavior of immi-
grants and natives who are identical along several dimensions. A key aspect of our approach
is that we focus on a commuting zone where the public infrastructure is so well-developed,
making public transportation the natural choice for the vast majority of commuters, render-
ing concerns about unobserved diﬀerences between ethnic groups in the taste or costs for
diﬀerent modes of transportation less relevant. Moreover, full-time commuters using public
transportation are guaranteed to be eligible for the commuting deduction.
In our regressions, we use native commuters as the reference group. We employ a linear
probability model to estimate the probability of taking up the commuting deduction. Our
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regression model is
Dijt = α+ βImmi +X
′
itγ +Occupationit + πj + λt + ǫit, (1)
where subscripts identify the commuter (i), the residential municipality (j) and the year
(t). Dijt is the binary outcome variable where the value 1 indicates take-up, i.e., that the
self-reported commuting cost is (strictly) above the eligibility threshold in the respective
year, while 0 means no take-up, i.e., the declared cost is zero or it is positive but does not
exceed the threshold (dominated region). Immi equals 1 if the commuter is an immigrant
and 0 otherwise. Xit is a set of control variables including age, gender, secondary school,
university, marital status (whether married or not) and annual earned taxable labor income.20
The variable Occupationit is a set of occupation dummies, corresponding to the categories
listed in Table 3. The dummy variable πj indicates whether the residential municipality is
Uppsala or not and λt controls for the year eﬀect. Finally, ǫit is an error term.
Figure 4 shows the regression results for the commuters between Stockholm and Uppsala
(Table A1 in Appendix A contains the results in table form). As we use native commuters as
the reference group, the estimated coeﬃcients should be interpreted as the relative diﬀerence
between immigrants and natives in terms of percentage points (positive coeﬃcients indicate
higher take-up of immigrants relative to natives). The upper left panel shows the results for
all immigrants. In total, the probability of taking up the commuting deduction is on average
similar between native and immigrant commuters (the estimated coeﬃcient is slightly above
zero but statistically insigniﬁcant). However, if we decompose immigrants by time since
arrival, we ﬁnd that immigrant commuters with fewer than ﬁve years of stay are signiﬁcantly
less likely to take up the deduction than natives, where the diﬀerence is about 7.8 percentage
points. Over time, immigrants increase their take-up (the estimated coeﬃcient becomes
smaller in size and insigniﬁcant after ﬁve years of stay) and it becomes even larger than
natives after more than ten years of stay (the coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant). In
Figure 4 we also decompose the eﬀect based on immigrants’ region of origin. We ﬁnd that
the diﬀerences relative to natives are mainly driven by immigrants from European and non-
European countries. Immigrants from Nordic countries behave more or less like natives,
however, they make up only 17 percent of the immigrant commuters (see Table 1).
20We have also performed regressions where we control for income in a nonlinear way, and all our qualitative
results remain the same. The results are shown in Table A6.
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Figure 4: The probability of taking up the commuting deduction by birth region and length
of stay.
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In our sample, more than 10 percent of commuters ﬁle a commuting cost in the ‘dominated
region’, i.e. above zero but below the eligibility threshold, as Figure 5 illustrates.21 We
analyze this behavior in a regression in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the self-
reported commuting deduction is in the dominated region (Table A2 in Appendix A contains
the regression in table form). The dependent variable is 0 if the stated cost is either zero or
above the threshold.
Similar to the previous results on the take-up of the commuting deduction, we see that
the total population of immigrants is not very diﬀerent from natives with respect to ﬁling in
the dominated region. However, as before, decomposing the immigrant population by length
of stay reveals a clear pattern. Recently arrived immigrants from Nordic and European
countries have signiﬁcantly higher propensity to ﬁle in the dominated region than natives,
perhaps because they expect such a deduction but are not fully informed about the rules.
Moreover, immigrants appear to learn over time, and after more than 10 years, immigrants
21Similar to the evidence for Pakistan shown in Kleven and Waseem (2013), our ﬁling in the dominated
region is also an example of ﬁling in a strictly dominated region that only has a cost and no beneﬁt; and
hence would not happen in a frictionless world.
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are clearly less likely than natives to ﬁle in the dominated region. Non-European immigrants
are already after 5 years of stay less likely than natives to ﬁle in the dominated region. In
contrast to European or Nordic immigrants, it might be that Non-Europeans are not ‘biased’
in the sense that they are not expecting a commuting deduction and are therefore less likely
to ﬁle in the dominated region. In other words, they are more likely either to not ﬁle the
deduction at all (zeros) or to ﬁle a ‘correct’ deduction above the threshold.
Figure 5: The probability of ﬁling a commuting cost in the dominated region
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Appendix A contains supplementary material to this section. Tables A1 – A6 present
regression results based on the classiﬁcation of birth region described above. Tables A7 – A11
contain regression results based on an alternative classiﬁcation of birth region. Table A12
presents extensive robustness checks with respect to occupation controls and more ﬂexible
age controls. Table A13 presents a formal analysis of heterogeneous take-up based on age,
ethnicity and duration of stay in the host country, basically conﬁrming the age gradient in
take-up as evident from Figure 3. Finally, Tables A14 and A15 report results for two other
commuting regions in Sweden.
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3.4 Discussion
Our main interest is to identify relevant diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behavior between natives
and immigrants. We have found that in the context of the commuting expense deduction,
that ﬁling behavior of immigrant commuters as a whole is on average similar to that of
natives. However, when diﬀerentiating immigrants by region of origin and length of stay in
Sweden, striking diﬀerences emerge. Immigrants initially have a lower take-up than natives,
but learn over time and after more than 10 years in the country they have an even higher
take-up than natives and ﬁle less in the dominated region. One clear diﬀerence between
European/Nordic immigrants and Non-Europeans is that the former initially ﬁle more in
the dominated region than natives do. We conjecture that this diﬀerence is due to the fact
that European and Nordic immigrants are on average more familiar with the concept of
commuting deductions, but do not fully understand the eligibility criteria. This conjecture
is supported by the results reported in Table A8 (Appendix A) from a regression that is
based on an alternative classiﬁcation of birth region, where we classify immigrants by the
type of tax system in their home country. We see that Western European (and Nordic)
immigrants, who are familiar with similar tax systems, ﬁle more in the dominated region
than immigrants from other regions.
Around 16 percent of commuters in our sample (native and immigrants) do not ﬁle
a commuting cost at all. This might have diﬀerent explanations. For recently arrived
immigrants, language barriers seem a convincing explanation, as the tax forms are sent out in
Swedish. This conjecture is supported by the higher level of compliance of Nordic immigrants,
and by the fact that immigrants catch up over time. A share of non-ﬁlers might commute by
car and therefore might know that they are not eligible for deductions because they do not
save two hours per round trip. There is also the possibility that individuals might be unaware
of the deduction and eligibility criteria, or simply make a conscious decision not to ﬁle. Full
compliance with the deduction rules requires collecting proof of one’s commuting cost and
adding up the expenditure. As a deduction is only granted for the amount exceeding the
threshold, this might not be suﬃciently attractive for everyone. Similarly, getting informed is
costly, too. Moreover, in Sweden (as in other Nordic countries), a typical taxpayer’s income
is close to completely third-party reported and the tax authority advertises the possibility to
receive an early tax return to those taxpayers who accept without changes the preliminary
tax statement that is sent to them by the authority. This might discourage taxpayers from
getting actively involved in information acquisition and deduction ﬁling.
Before closing this section we would like to make three additional remarks regarding the
interpretation of our estimates.
First, the literature has documented that there is a large amount of tax evasion and
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cheating regarding self-reported items on tax declarations (e.g., Paetzold and Winner 2016).
The Swedish tax authority also reports substantial problems with incorrect or outright un-
justiﬁed deductions (Skatteverket 2018). Our data allows us to highlight diﬀerences in tax
ﬁling behavior between natives and immigrants, which is the focus of this study. We are not
able to identify cheating. However, by construction of our sample, we try to make sure that
we identify eligible commuters with high probability.
Second, the sample of commuters is potentially selected since knowledge of the commuting
deduction might inﬂuence residential and workplace location choices (i.e. the decision to
become a commuter). This might lead us to understate the group diﬀerences since less
informed taxpayers are less likely to become commuters and immigrants are more likely to
be uninformed. However, we are not sure about the quantitative signiﬁcance of this eﬀect.
Third, although we have been able to control for a rich set of covariates in our analysis,
we cannot rule out that there are unobserved diﬀerences between natives and immigrants
regarding their preferred mode of transportation (car vs. public transport). We presume,
however, that conditional on observable covariates, given our focus on individuals with rel-
atively high incomes and high education and the well-developed public infrastructure in
the Uppsala-Stockholm region, diﬀerences in preferences regarding car travel and public
transportation between the two groups should not be too much of a concern. A widened
explanation for our ﬁndings could be that as immigrants integrate into society, both their
familiarity with public transport and their familiarity with tax rules increase, starting from a
potentially lower level than natives. Our results in the second empirical example (bunching)
that we turn to in the next section makes us, however, conﬁdent that knowledge about the
tax system is the driving factor behind our ﬁndings.
4 Case 2: Bunching estimates
Economic theory predicts that if a population of individuals have diﬀerent (smoothly dis-
tributed) preferences over pre-tax income and consumption due to diﬀerent earnings capaci-
ties, there should be an excess mass of taxpayers at points of the tax schedule where marginal
tax rates discontinuously increase. In a very inﬂuential paper, Saez (2010) showed that this
mass is proportional to the taxable income elasticity, which is a key parameter used when as-
sessing the distortionary costs of income taxation. Our second empirical example compares
the tax ﬁling behavior of self-employed natives and immigrants by estimating elasticities
capturing behavioral responses to changes in marginal tax rates at the ﬁrst kink point of the
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Swedish central government income tax.22
A key issue in the contemporary bunching literature is the question to which extent the
bunching method is actually able to detect bunching responses if individuals cannot perfectly
control their income level. For example, if individuals desire to locate at the kink point, but
face a symmetric and normally distributed optimization error, then no bunching will be
visible, provided the variance of the error component is suﬃciently large. For this reason,
the bunching results that have been most informative are those that relate to self-employed
individuals (who by virtue of setting their own salaries have a greater ﬂexibility to bunch at
the kink) and for institutional settings with very large kinks (where the utility cost of not
bunching at the kink also is large).
The major advantage of the Swedish tax kink is that it is very large (in recent years, an
increase in the marginal tax rate of 20 percentage points) and located in the upper middle
part of the income distribution where many taxpayers are located and the underlying income
distribution is smooth and triangular shaped.23 Therefore, the Swedish kink point provides
an excellent laboratory to examine diﬀerential responses in bunching behavior between native
and immigrant groups of the population. Bastani and Selin (2014) demonstrated that self-
employed individuals sharply bunch at the kink, although the sizes of the implied elasticities
were not very large. In this paper, we are not interested in the absolute elasticity of taxable
income for self-employed individuals, but rather in the difference in the elasticity between
natives and immigrants. We use the kink as a very salient example of a tax incentive in
our quest to understand diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behavior between diﬀerent groups of the
population.
4.1 Data
For our bunching analysis, we use data on the universe of Swedish taxpayers from 2002 to
2015, focusing on self-employed individuals.24. The location of the ﬁrst central governmental
tax kink point diﬀers across years. We convert the taxable income distribution and thresholds
to 2015 prices and consider the working-age population between age 20 and 64.
22This is the same kink point that was analyzed by Bastani and Selin (2014). In similarity to that paper,
we use the reﬁnement of Saez’s bunching method developed by Chetty et al. (2011) who showed how one
can estimate the excess mass at a kink point by estimating how the taxable income distribution would look
like in the absence of a kink (the counter-factual distribution) by ﬁtting a polynomial, excluding a certain
interval around the kink.
23The identiﬁcation assumption underlying the bunching method is that there should be no spike in the
counter-factual distribution at the income level of the kink.
24In the population data, Statistics Sweden (SCB) deﬁnes a person as self-employed in a given year, if that
person’s November income is mainly derived from self-employment activities. If a person has both wage and
self-employment income and the self-employment income multiplied by 1.6 is greater than wage income in
November, SCB will classify the person as self-employed.
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In bunching studies, the researcher typically speciﬁes a ’small’ and a ’wide’ bunching
window. The small bunching window determines the income observations around the kink
point that should be excluded when ﬁtting the counter-factual distribution (i.e. what the
taxable income distribution would look like in the absence of a kink). The wide bunching
window speciﬁes how much data to the left and to the right of the small bunching window
that is available for the estimation of the counter-factual distribution. The size of the
large bunching window is of less importance provided one restricts the interval to regions of
the income distribution that have the same shape and as long as one does not choose the
window so large so as to include other kink points or discontinuities in the tax code that
could contaminate the results.
Following Bastani and Selin (2014), we select a sample of self-employed individuals with
earned taxable income falling into a wide bunching window of SEK [-75k, 75k] around the
ﬁrst kink point of the central government tax in a given year. As before, we deﬁne im-
migrants as foreign-born. We further classify immigrants into European immigrants and
non-European immigrants.25 Following the above deﬁnitions, the sample includes 1 230 926
self-employed natives and 123 671 self-employed immigrants. Among self-employed immi-
grants, the number of immigrants from European countries and non-European countries are
78 949 and 44 722, respectively. Panel A of Table B1 (Appendix B) contains summary
statistics for the sample.
We calculate the distance between each individuals’ taxable income and the ﬁrst central
governmental kink point. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the distance to the kink for
diﬀerent groups of the population, where the vertical line indicates the location of the ﬁrst
central governmental kink point. The left panel compares the distributions for self-employed
natives and European immigrants whereas the right panel shows the distributions for self-
employed natives and non-European immigrants. In the left panel, we observe a sharp spike
at the kink that is similar in magnitude for both natives and European immigrants and the
two distributions appear quite similar. In the right panel, however, clear diﬀerences emerge.
Notably, the spike is smaller for Non-European immigrants than for natives and the density
to the left of the kink looks quite diﬀerent.
25The bunching estimation is data-intensive. Therefore, we include Nordic immigrants as a part of the
European immigrants, diﬀerent from our classiﬁcation in the commuter deduction analysis. As before,
European immigrants include immigrants from Canada, U.S. and Oceania countries.
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Figure 6: Distance to the ﬁrst kink point of the central government tax, 2002-2015
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Baseline results
In our analysis, we ﬁx the wide bunching window to SEK [-75k, 75k] and perform a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the size of the small bunching window, choosing intervals between
SEK [-5k, 5k] and SEK [-1k, 1k] around the kink point. We use diﬀerent sets of small
bunching windows because the selection of the small window is subjective. A too small (large)
bunching window would underestimate (overestimate) the excess mass and the associated
behavioral response. As our parametric ﬁt of the counter-factual distribution we use a 7th
degree polynomial.26 All standard errors for the estimated excess mass are computed using
a conventional bootstrap procedure. For each estimate of the excess mass at the kink, we
26Sensitivity checks using diﬀerent bunching windows and polynomial orders are shown in Tables B3
and B4 in Appendix B, and the results are robust. The diﬀerence in excess mass between self-employed
natives and European immigrants remains small, whereas the diﬀerence between self-employed natives and
non-European immigrants remains large.
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compute the corresponding taxable income elasticity.27
Figure 7: Baseline bunching estimates and regression coeﬃcients
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The results are shown in Figure 7. The upper panel of the ﬁgure displays taxable income
elasticities for immigrants obtained through bunching estimation, expressed as a percentage
of the corresponding native elasticities. The lower panel shows the diﬀerences between
natives and immigrants in terms of the probability to locate in a given interval around the
kink, as measured by a multivariable regression controlling for background characteristics.
We begin by describing the upper panel which contains the bunching estimates. Looking
at the results for the small bunching window [-5k, 5k], we see that the diﬀerence in taxable
income elasticity between self-employed natives and European immigrants is small.28 On
average, the implied elasticity for self-employed European immigrants is around 90 percent of
the native elasticity. In contrast, the elasticity for self-employed non-European immigrants is
only about 60 percent of the native elasticity (upper right panel of Figure 7). Complementing
27For details on the computation of the taxable income elasticity, refer to the text in the beginning of
Appendix B.
28Observe that the results are similar for the other ”small” windows. Notice also that Table B2 (upper
half, Appendix B) shows that the elasticity for self-employed natives is about 0.041.
23
Figure 7, we present the corresponding graphical bunching analyses in Figure B1 (Appendix
B) and the exact bunching estimates as well as the implied elasticities for each group in the
upper half of Table B2 (Appendix B).
The bunching analysis highlights diﬀerent bunching behavior between natives and, es-
pecially, non-European, immigrants. However, these diﬀerences might be due to diﬀerences
in individual characteristics as well as due to regional diﬀerences. Therefore, we comple-
ment the bunching estimation with regressions where we are able to control for individual
characteristics and municipal ﬁxed eﬀects.29
We focus on the following linear probability model:
Yijt = α+ βEuropei + γNonEuropei +X
′
itθ + πj + λt + ǫit (2)
The subscripts i, j and t denote individual, municipality and year. The dependent bi-
nary variable Y equals 1 if the taxable income is within the small bunching window and 0
otherwise. The dummy variables Europe and NonEurope indicate the region of origin of
immigrants, with self-employed natives as the reference group. The estimated coeﬃcients β
and γ measure to what extent the propensity of an immigrant’s taxable income falling in
the small bunching window diﬀers from that of self-employed natives. Xit is a set of control
variables: age, female, secondary school, university and marital status. πj and λt control for
municipality and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
The regressions results are presented in graphical form in the lower half of Figure 7
(see Table B2 in Appendix B for more detailed results). The estimated coeﬃcients for
self-employed European immigrants are quantitatively small and statistically insigniﬁcant,
supporting the ﬁnding above that bunching among European immigrants is not very diﬀerent
from bunching among natives. In contrast, the coeﬃcients for non-European immigrants vary
from about -0.03 to about -0.04 as we shrink the small bunching window from [-5k, 5k] to [-1k,
1k] SEK, and all the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant. The probability of a non-European
immigrant to fall into the small bunching window of SEK [-5k, 5k] is about 3 percentage
points lower than that of self-employed natives. Altogether, the regression results are in
line with the bunching estimation in the sense that they show that self-employed natives
respond more to the kink than self-employed non-European immigrants, whereas Eurpean
29For this regression analysis, we restrict the sample to the wide window SEK [-10k, 10k] around the central
governmental tax point, which makes earnings ability among the self-employed more comparable. This sub-
sample contains 265 671 natives, 15 827 European immigrants and 7 729 non-European immigrants. In the
restricted sample, 169 643 natives, 9 903 European immigrants and 4 572 non-European immigrants have
incomes that fall in the small bunching window [-5k, 5k]. The summary statistics for this restricted sample
are given in panel B of Table B1 (Appendix B).
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immigrants exhibit similar behavior as natives.30
Having presented the baseline bunching analysis, we now take a closer look at how the
composition of our sample of self-employed immigrants aﬀects the bunching results. We
ﬁrst look at ethnic segregation at the place of residence, followed by analyzing the role
organizational form for the self-employed, i.e., whether their businesses are incorporated or
not. For each case, we conduct a bunching estimation as well as regressions as described
above.
We have also repeated the bunching analysis using taxable income before any deductions.
The results do not diﬀer much from the baseline results, indicating that self-employed people
mainly use either labor supply or income planning to locate at the kink point rather than
deductions. This is in line with Paetzold (2019b) who showed that deductions are not a
major channel for income adjustment for self-employed in Austria.
In our commuting deduction analysis we considered immigrants’ time since arrival in the
host country to be an interesting dimension to study. This is also an interesting dimension
to consider in the bunching analysis. However, the average length of stay for self-employed
European and non-European immigrants is about 27 and 21 years respectively. Given that
the bunching analysis is conducted in a high income region of the income distribution, sample
size limitations precent us from investigating this issue here.31
4.2.2 Residential segregation
The advantages and disadvantages of living in an ethnic enclave have been discussed in
the literature.32 On the one hand, an ethnic enclave may facilitate the transmission of
information among immigrants. On the other hand, a more segregated area may hinder
integration and access to information due to fewer interactions with natives and the society of
30We have also done the regression for the large window SEK [-10k, 20k]. The results are shown in Table
B5 in Appendix B. The ﬁndings remain robust.
31We have performed bunching analyses for European and non-European immigrants based on whether
their length of stay is more than 20 years. The analysis shows that the variable ‘time since arrival’ plays
a less important role in this exercise. For immigrants with less than 20 years of stay, the taxable income
elasticity as a percentage of the native one is about 92% and 64% for European and non-European immigrants
respectively. For immigrants with more than 20 years of stay, the corresponding ﬁgures are about 82% and
58% for European and non-European immigrants respectively. We have also performed the corresponding
regression analyses. Again, we ﬁnd that self-employed non-European immigrants, regardless of length of stay,
are less likely to be located in the small bunching window as compared to self-employed natives, whereas
bunching behavior of self-employed European immigrants, regardless of length of stay, is statistically similar
to self-employed natives.
32It has been argued that local social networks aﬀect individual response to welfare take-up through
information and through norms, e.g., Bertrand et al. (2000) who use language to proxy for the size of the
local social network. For policy makers, the presence of network eﬀects needs to be taken into account as
it can strengthen the eﬀect of policies (through multiplier eﬀects) or weaken them, if the network ‘pressure’
discourages take-up directly or indirectly.
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the host country. An ethnic enclave can also exert ‘pressure’ through norms and (perceived)
stigma cost. Therefore, tax ﬁling behavior of immigrants living in an ethnic enclave may
diﬀer from that immigrants who live in less segregated areas.
In the data, we can identify individuals’ residential location at parish level. A munic-
ipality in Sweden can include several parishes. According to Statistics Sweden, there are
about 290 municipalities and about 1 500 parishes in Sweden in 2011. In this section, we
restrict attention to the years 2002–2014 for which the parish data is available. Using the
whole population data of Sweden, we calculate, for each parish, the share of European immi-
grants and the share of non-European immigrants.33 These shares, respectively, constitute
a distribution of immigrant shares (at parish level) for the whole of Sweden, separately for
European and non-European immigrants.34 Using these two distributions, we deﬁne, respec-
tively, three immigrant concentration levels with cutoﬀs at the 25th and 75th percentile of
the distribution.35 Thus, we obtain a measure of whether a given self-employed European
(non-European) immigrant lives in a parish with low, medium or high concentration of Euro-
pean (non-European) immigrants. As before, the wide income windows for the bunching and
regression analysis are SEK [-75k, 75k] and [-10k, 10k], respectively, but the small bunching
window is always [-5k, 5k].
The upper half of Figure 8 displays bunching estimates of taxable income elasticities for
self-employed immigrants relative to natives. The corresponding graphical bunching analysis
is shown in Figures B2 and B3 (Appendix B). The elasticity for natives is about 0.041. For
self-employed European immigrants, the elasticity is close to the native level, but decreasing
in the concentration of European immigrants in the parish. For non-European immigrants
who live in less segregated areas, the elasticity is close to that of natives, as the upper right
panel of Figure 8 (Low concentration) shows. However, for non-European immigrants living
in more segregated areas, the elasticity is only about half of the native elasticity.
Next, we turn to the regression results, which are shown in the bottom half of Figure 8
(Table B6 in Appendix B contains the results in table form). In all the regressions, natives are
the reference group. The estimated coeﬃcients for European immigrants (lower left panel
of Figure 8) are quantitatively small and not statistically signiﬁcant. For non-European
immigrants, we ﬁnd that those who live in less segregated areas are (statistically) similar
to natives in terms of the likelihood of falling into the bunching window SEK [-5k, 5k].
33To be precise, the share is computed as the total number of European (resp. non-European) immigrants
divided by the total population in the given parish.
34The smallest share of European immigrants in any parish is 0.69 percent and the largest is 47 per-
cent. The respective numbers for non-European immigrants are 0.16 percent and 46 percent. The absolute
immigrant share of Sweden is 19 percent in 2018.
35These cutoﬀs can be expressed in terms of absolute immigrant concentration. The numbers are 7 percent
and 13 percent for European immigrants. For non-Europeans they are 5 percent and 19 percent.
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However, non-European immigrants that live in more segregated parishes (medium and high
concentration) are about 5 percentage points less likely than self-employed natives to fall
into the income interval SEK [-5k, 5k]. To sum up, the results indicate that immigrants,
particularly non-European immigrants, who live in less segregated areas might be better
integrated into the host country’s society from a tax ﬁling behavior perspective. However, it
is also important to point out that we cannot establish causality here, e.g., we do not know
whether individual behavior changes when immigrants move into a more or less segregated
area. We hope to explore this in future work.36
Figure 8: Residential segregation: Bunching and regression analysis
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4.2.3 Organizational form
Engström and Holmlund (2009) have shown that self-employed individuals with unincor-
36One possibility would be to use some refugee placement policy (see e.g., Edin et al. 2003, Åslund 2005,
and Åslund and Rooth 2007 for Sweden and Damm 2014 for Denmark). The Swedish placement policy
occurred in 1987-1991 when the tax system looked quite diﬀerent as compared to our period of 2002-2014
and it is an open question whether it would provide suﬃciently strong variation in immigration concentration
to highlight diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behavior several decades later, given the possibility for people to change
location since their initial placement and given our focus on individuals with relatively high incomes.
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porated businesses diﬀer in their income reporting behavior from self-employed with incor-
porated businesses. Incorporated ﬁrms may use more professional tax planning, but they
also tend to have more employees and ﬁrm owners, making it more diﬃcult for a single
self-employed individual connected to an incorporated ﬁrm to perfectly adjust their salary.
Hence whether incorporated or unincorporated business owners are more or less likely to
bunch at the kink is ambiguous.
In Table B1 (Appendix B, for the wider window [-75k, 75k]), we show summary statistics,
describing the composition of our sample with respect to organizational form. We see that
about 61 percent of self-employed natives are connected to an incorporated business while
the corresponding ﬁgures for European and non-European immigrants are about 51 percent
and 37 percent. As before, we perform bunching estimation and regressions, in this case
focusing only the small bunching window SEK [-5k, 5k].
The upper half of Figure 9 shows the diﬀerence in elasticity between immigrants and
natives, divided up by organization form. The corresponding graphical bunching analyses
are shown in Figures B4 and B5 (Appendix B). First, consider incorporated businesses.
The elasticity for self-employed natives associated with incorporated businesses is about
0.022, which is smaller than the native elasticity in the baseline results. The corresponding
elasticity for European immigrants is close to that of natives, whereas the elasticity for non-
European immigrants is only about 60 percent of the native. Turning to unincorporated
businesses, the elasticity for natives is about 0.074. The elasticity diﬀerence between natives
and all immigrants is larger than for incorporated businesses. The taxable income elasticity
of non-European immigrants is only half of that of natives. The results show that self-
employed people with unincorporated businesses bunch more than those with incorporated
businesses. Moreover, the behavioral diﬀerence between natives and immigrants is larger
among individuals tied to unincorporated ﬁrms than among those tied to incorporated ﬁrms.
The bottom half of Figure 9 illustrates the regressions results for the propensity to have a
taxable income falling into the small bunching window (the more detailed regression results
are presented in Tables B7 and B8 in Appendix B). Among the self-employed with incor-
porated businesses, we ﬁnd that non-European immigrants are about 3 percentage points
less likely than natives to fall in the small bunching window. European immigrants, on the
other hand, are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from natives. As regards to unincor-
porated businesses, we ﬁnd a large probability diﬀerence between non-European immigrants
and natives. On average, the probability of having a taxable income falling within the small
bunching window for non-European immigrants is about 8 percentage points less than that
of natives. The diﬀerence between European immigrants and natives is smaller, around
3 percentage points. Thus, the regression results qualitatively support the ﬁndings of the
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bunching estimation.
Figure 9: Organizational form: bunching and regression analysis
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The taxable income elasticity for self-employed native with incorporated and unincorporated business are 0.022 and 0.074 respectively.In the regression analysis, the reference group are self-employed native with incorporated business and with unincorporated business.
Appendix B contains supplementary material to this section. Figure B1 contains the
graphical bunching analysis for the baseline case. Table B2 contains more detailed results
of the bunching estimation and regressions in table form. Tables B3, B4 and B5 contain
sensitivity checks. Table B1 contain summary statistics for the samples used in the bunching
estimation and regressions. Figures B2 – B3 show the regression and bunching results for the
residential segregation analysis, where Table B6 contains the regression results in table form.
Finally, Tables B7 and B8, as well as Figures B4 and B5 provide regression and bunching
results for the analysis of the role organizational form.
4.3 Discussion
The general picture that emerges from the bunching analysis is that self-employed immigrants
exhibit clearly less bunching behavior than native self-employed. There is a substantial
diﬀerence between European and non-European immigrants, where European immigrants
exhibit behavior close to that of natives. There is a clear correlation between the degree
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of residential segregation and the distance of immigrants to native bunching behavior. The
distance is furthermore increasing in the residential concentration of immigrants with the
same region of origin. This segregation eﬀect is stronger for Non-European self-employed
immigrants. A noteworthy exception is non-European immigrants living in low-segregation
areas, who are quite close to native bunching behavior. The gap between self-employed
natives and immigrants is substantially smaller among those with incorporated businesses,
maybe due to reasons relating to higher entry requirements for incorporated businesses and
cultures in such businesses regarding formalized tax preparation. Before closing this section,
we should mention that the literature on self-employment has highlighted the diﬀerent forces
that may cause individuals to enter self-employment. For example, some are ’pushed’ into
self-employment due to lack of opportunities in wage employment, others are ’pulled’ into
self-employment due to business opportunities. Furthermore, the selection process is likely
to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent immigrant groups, which could explain some of the discrepancies
in bunching behavior between natives and immigrants that we have found. Here it should
be noted that we focus on high income groups in the population that arguably have decent
opportunities both in wage employment and self-employment. However, some obstacles to
ﬁnding wage employment, such as labor market discrimination, could be relevant also for
highly skilled groups of the population.37
5 Further Results
In this ﬁnal section, we present some further results regarding diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behav-
ior between natives and immigrants. We focus on three diﬀerent measures. First, we look
at whether or not individuals have been ﬁned for submitting their tax declaration after the
deadline. The Swedish Tax Agency imposes a fee for late ﬁling where the fee typically is
between 1000 and 3000 SEK. Second, we examine the incidence of audits. The tax authority
runs audits of tax declarations, and in case of incorrect ﬁling, imposes penalties of around
20 to 40 percent of the unpaid tax. Third, we examine the diﬀerence between the prelim-
inary income tax amount sent to the taxpayer by the authority and the ﬁnal tax amount.
Whether or not these two amounts are diﬀerent provides a measure of the taxpayer’s active
participation in income reporting: If the amounts diﬀer, the taxpayer has made additional
declarations. If the amounts are equal, the taxpayer either had nothing to declare in addi-
tion, or has not exercised that option. As mentioned earlier, the tax authority grants early
tax returns for taxpayers who accept the preliminary tax statement without asking for ad-
ditional tax deductions. In all these exercises, we focus on the whole immigrant population,
37See Hammarstedt and Miao (2019) for a recent analysis of self-employment in Sweden.
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which includes both low income and high income taxpayers.
We create three binary variables: i) whether the taxpayer has been engaged in late tax
ﬁling; ii) whether the authority has imposed tax surcharges for incorrect tax ﬁling; and iii)
whether the taxpayer is not actively participating in the tax declaration. A taxpayer is
deﬁned as not actively participating in the tax declaration if the preliminary tax is equal
to the ﬁnal tax. Using these three variables as dependent variables, we examine the eﬀect
of immigrant status (and origin), using natives as the reference group. We employ a linear
probability model, controlling for age, gender, education attainment, marital status, total
taxable income, municipality and a year ﬁxed eﬀect.
We ﬁnd that immigrants have a larger probability of ﬁling their taxes late, independently
of their length of stay in the host country. When diﬀerentiating by income (in three groups,
divided by the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile), we ﬁnd one exception to this pattern. Low
income immigrants (except for Nordic immigrants) behave similar to natives, although the
estimated coeﬃcients are not economically signiﬁcant (see Figure C1 in Appendix C).
We ﬁnd that immigrants have a higher propensity for non-compliance (as measured by
the audit measure), regardless of length of stay. As we see in Figure C2 in Appendix C,
there is again an exception for low-income European and non-European immigrants: they are
similar to natives. Moreover, tax non-compliance increases with income for non-European
immigrants (see Figure C2, lower left panel). Diﬀerentiating the population according to
the composition of their income sources, we ﬁnd that the diﬀerence in tax non-compliance
between natives and immigrants is substantially larger for those with business income. All
these results should be interpreted with caution, as we have no information about how the
tax authority selects taxpayers to be audited.
Finally, we ﬁnd that immigrants are less likely to actively participate in income declara-
tion (see Figure C3 in Appendix C). There is a very clear trend with respect to length of
stay in the host country: Immigrants close most of the gap over time (even when controlling
for total taxable income), but there remains a diﬀerence even after more than 10 years in
the country. The gap remains the largest for non-European immigrants.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have analyzed diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behavior between natives and immi-
grants using population-wide data from Sweden and two speciﬁc empirical examples.
Our ﬁrst empirical example examined the diﬀerence in the take-up of commuting deduc-
tions between immigrants and natives, controlling for a rich set of covariates. We found that
immigrants with a longer stay in the host country (independent of origin) and immigrants
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from Nordic and European countries, behave more like natives whereas the diﬀerences are
strongest for non-European immigrants who have recently arrived in the host country. The
gap to natives is closed over time, and the gap is closed completely for individuals with more
than 10 years in the host country. Interestingly, immigrants with the longest stay in the host
country ﬁle even more than natives.
Our second empirical exercise examined diﬀerences between natives and immigrants in
terms of the extent of bunching among the self-employed in response to a very large and
salient kink point of the Swedish income tax schedule. These bunching responses, that
reﬂect causal responses to the tax system, show that there are striking diﬀerences in tax ﬁling
behavior between natives and immigrants, even for immigrant self-employed who have stayed
in Sweden for a long time. Moreover, we have seen that diﬀerences in bunching behavior
between natives and immigrants are strongly correlated with residential segregation. This
is especially the case when examining non-European immigrants. An interesting exception
is non-European immigrants living in low-segregation areas, who behave similar to natives.
We do not, however, know whether our results are driven by selection into these areas, or
whether there are true exposure eﬀects as documented by, e.g., Chetty et al. (2013).
We complemented our study examining several measures of tax compliance for the whole
population of Swedish taxpayers. Immigrants are more likely to miss the declaration deadline
and to be ﬁned for non-compliance, regardless of their length of stay in the country. An
exception are low-income immigrants whose behavior is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that
of natives. Immigrants are also less likely to actively participate in the tax declaration
process (through the ﬁling of deductions etc.), but most of this gap closes over time.
Several remarks are in order. First, immigration to Sweden has not been homogeneous
over time in terms of source countries, skills and migration motives, just to name a few
relevant aspects. We have set out to document diﬀerences in behavior between immigrants
and natives regarding tax ﬁling behavior in one particular time window, but we have not
explicitly studied the process of convergence in tax ﬁling behavior between natives and
immigrants by following individuals over time. A large body of work in the migration
literature has studied the process of assimilation and immigrant’s economic convergence
towards natives. In the US context, this research has shown that earlier cohorts of immigrants
assimilate faster towards natives than later cohorts due to diﬀerences in earnings abilities
(see, e.g., Borjas 1995). In our context, these cohort eﬀects are likely to be less important, and
our results are potentially easier to generalize to other contexts, since in both our empirical
examples, we focus on samples of immigrants and natives that have high incomes (and are
thereby integrated into the labor market) and share a similarly high education background.
Second, our study documents diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behavior, but cannot address the issue
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of tax evasion or cheating. In that sense, a part of the documented behavioral diﬀerences
might be diﬀerences in tax evasion. However, regardless of the cause of the behavioral
diﬀerences, the fairness of taxation is aﬀected and the consequences of a low take up are
materialized. Third, there seems to be scope for policy intervention (we refer to some
successful policy measures in the literature section), such as alleviating language barriers
for recently arrived immigrants, but a range of open questions remain, e.g., whether or not
segregation and network eﬀects cause the observed diﬀerences in tax ﬁling behavior that we
have documented, or why a substantial gap in bunching behavior remains even after a very
long time in the host country. We hope to address these questions in future research.
The primary focus of our paper has been to analyze the diﬀerential take-up by informed
(native) and less informed (immigrant) workers, highlighting the eﬀects of tax complexity
on take-up in ethnically diverse populations. We have not formally analyzed the impact of
diﬀerential take-up on equilibrium spatial patterns in labor markets. This is an important
research question with implications for a range of diﬀerent aspects, such as labor supply, the
formation of ethnic enclaves, urban sprawl and the quality of employer-employee matching.
A formal analysis of such eﬀects may be possible using our policy context, but is left as
another interesting direction for future research.
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7 Appendix A (Commuting deduction)
Table A1 shows the regression results for commuters between Stockholm and Uppsala. The
reference group is always native commuters.
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Table A1: The probability of taking up the commuting deduction among Stockholm and
Uppsala commuters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.00154 0.00835
(0.00529) (0.00519)
Nordic Imm. -0.00209 -0.0226
(0.0120) (0.0118)
Europe. Imm. -0.00370 -0.0111
(0.00830) (0.00811)
Non-Europe. Imm 0.00722 0.0367**
(0.00763) (0.00743)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.128** -0.0785**
(0.0139) (0.0139)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0571** -0.0267
(0.0146) (0.0144)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0356** 0.0301**
(0.00595) (0.00581)
Non-Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.157** -0.0650**
(0.0249) (0.0248)
Non-Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.101** -0.0462
(0.0253) (0.0251)
Non-Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0393** 0.0573**
(0.00825) (0.00800)
Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.127** -0.0959**
(0.0185) (0.0187)
Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0409* -0.0254
(0.0201) (0.0198)
Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0456** 0.0196*
(0.0101) (0.00980)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0677 -0.0372
(0.0362) (0.0357)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0105 0.0187
(0.0366) (0.0357)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs 0.00844 -0.0252
(0.0135) (0.0133)
Control variables
Age 0.00574** 0.00578** 0.00560** 0.00567**
(0.000163) (0.000163) (0.000164) (0.000165)
Married 0.00148 0.00119 0.00278 0.00240
(0.00361) (0.00361) (0.00362) (0.00361)
Secondary School 0.0786** 0.0792** 0.0768** 0.0775**
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105)
University 0.101** 0.102** 0.101** 0.101**
(0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0105)
Female -0.0378** -0.0373** -0.0382** -0.0378**
(0.00363) (0.00363) (0.00363) (0.00363)
Earned taxable labor income 4.55e-09 4.84e-09 4.19e-09 4.53e-09
(5.35e-09) (5.37e-09) (5.34e-09) (5.36e-09)
Occupation dummies
Reference group: Legislators, senior oﬃcials and managers
Professionals 0.0424** 0.0424** 0.0425** 0.0424**
(0.00575) (0.00575) (0.00575) (0.00575)
Technicians and associated professionals 0.00887 0.00859 0.00868 0.00857
(0.00642) (0.00642) (0.00642) (0.00642)
Clerks 0.0277** 0.0269** 0.0278** 0.0274**
(0.00925) (0.00925) (0.00925) (0.00925)
Service workers and shop sales workers -0.0972** -0.0999** -0.0974** -0.0990**
(0.00959) (0.00960) (0.00958) (0.00960)
Skilled agricultural workers -0.169** -0.170** -0.166** -0.166**
(0.0604) (0.0606) (0.0601) (0.0603)
Craft and related trade workers -0.249** -0.249** -0.249** -0.248**
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.0774** 0.0762** 0.0776** 0.0766**
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0140)
Elementary occupations -0.155** -0.160** -0.148** -0.150**
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0167)
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
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Next, we look at commuters who ﬁle commuting cost in the dominated region, i.e., above
zero but below the threshold. The dependent variable equals 1 if the self-reported commuting
cost is above zero but does not exceed the threshold and equals 0 if the self-report commuting
cost is either zero or (strictly) above the threshold. The results are shown in Table A2.
Table A2: The probability of ﬁling the commuting deduction in the dominated region
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dominated Dominated Dominated Dominated
region region region region
Immigrant -0.00733*
(0.00325)
Nordic Imm. 0.0102
(0.00748)
Europe. Imm. 0.00591
(0.00538)
Non-Europe. Imm -0.0252**
(0.00439)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs 0.0333**
(0.0103)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.00788
(0.00917)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs -0.0147**
(0.00348)
Non-Europe. imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.00710
(0.0165)
Non-Europe. imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0302*
(0.0137)
Non-Europe. imm. > 10 yrs -0.0267**
(0.00471)
Europe. imm. ≤ 5 yrs 0.0392**
(0.0141)
Europe. imm. 5-10 yrs 0.00590
(0.0134)
Europe. imm. > 10 yrs -0.00470
(0.00614)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs 0.0976**
(0.0302)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs -0.00668
(0.0252)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.000449
(0.00771)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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Table A3: The probability of taking up the commuting deduction for commuters between
Stockholm and Uppsala who work in the same workplace for two consecutive years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.0185**
(0.00601)
Nordic Imm. -0.0206
(0.0134)
Europe. Imm. -0.00121
(0.00923)
Non-Europe. Imm 0.0564**
(0.00882)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0820**
(0.0190)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.00742
(0.0172)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0371**
(0.00656)
Non-Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0592
(0.0369)
Non-Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0300
(0.0330)
Non-Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0746**
(0.00923)
Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.110**
(0.0249)
Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.000383
(0.0226)
Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0253*
(0.0107)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.00685
(0.0458)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs 0.0142
(0.0421)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0255
(0.0148)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52 872 52 872 52 872 52 872
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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Table A4: The probability of taking up the commuting deduction for commuters with wage
income above SEK 100k
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.00654
(0.00497)
Nordic Imm. -0.0228*
(0.0114)
Europe. Imm. -0.0137
(0.00782)
Non-Europe. Imm 0.0346**
(0.00706)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0841**
(0.0126)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0347**
(0.0134)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0326**
(0.00565)
Non-Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0767**
(0.0211)
Non-Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0507*
(0.0220)
Non-Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0598**
(0.00775)
Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0949**
(0.0175)
Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0284
(0.0191)
Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0208*
(0.00956)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0557
(0.0334)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs -0.00957
(0.0347)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0211
(0.0130)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 85 010 85 004 84 932 84 926
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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Table A5: The probability of taking up the commuting deduction for commuters with wage
income above SEK 200k
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.0121*
(0.00529)
Nordic Imm. -0.0152
(0.0119)
Europe. Imm. -0.00561
(0.00822)
Non-Europe. Imm 0.0391**
(0.00768)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0708**
(0.0150)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0169
(0.0150)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0315**
(0.00589)
Non-Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0467
(0.0283)
Non-Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0362
(0.0270)
Non-Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0549**
(0.00820)
Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0985**
(0.0197)
Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0134
(0.0204)
Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0275**
(0.00980)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.00677
(0.0374)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs 0.0162
(0.0368)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0209
(0.0134)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 74 133 74 132 74 061 74 060
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
7.1 Results based on an alternative classification of birth region
In tables A7 – A11, we repeat most of the commuting deduction analysis for an alternative
classiﬁcation of birth region of immigrants. The idea is to group immigrants by the proximity
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Table A6: The probability of taking up the commuting deduction among Stockholm and
Uppsala commuters, including nonlinear controls for income.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.00969
(0.00519)
Nordic Imm. -0.0227
(0.0118)
Europe. Imm. -0.00955
(0.00810)
Non-Europe. Imm 0.0385**
(0.00743)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0761**
(0.0139)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0251
(0.0144)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0312**
(0.00581)
Non-Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0617*
(0.0247)
Non-Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0436
(0.0251)
Non-Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0588**
(0.00801)
Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0938**
(0.0187)
Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0242
(0.0197)
Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0210*
(0.00979)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0353
(0.0357)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs 0.0193
(0.0357)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0258
(0.0133)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income (quadratic form).
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of the country of origin’s legal and tax system to that of Sweden by distinguishing between
Nordic, Western European, and other immigrants.
Table A7: The probability of claiming communting deduction (alternative classiﬁcation of
birth region)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.00835
(0.00519)
Nordic Imm. -0.0226
(0.0118)
Western Europe. Imm. -0.0386**
(0.0130)
Other. Imm. 0.0265**
(0.00613)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0785**
(0.0139)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0267
(0.0144)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0301**
(0.00581)
Other imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0644**
(0.0181)
Other imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0300
(0.0183)
Other imm. > 10 yrs 0.0480**
(0.00675)
Western Europe. imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.126**
(0.0263)
Western Europe. imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0439
(0.0297)
Western Europe. imm. > 10 yrs 0.00643
(0.0168)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0372
(0.0357)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs 0.0187
(0.0357)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0252
(0.0133)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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Table A8: The probability of ﬁling commuting deduction in the dominated region (alternative
classiﬁcation of birth region).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dominated Dominated Dominated Dominated
region region region region
Immigrant -0.00740*
(0.00322)
Nordic Imm. 0.00816
(0.00736)
Western Europe. Imm. 0.0195*
(0.00880)
Other Imm. -0.0172**
(0.00373)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs 0.0337**
(0.0103)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.00730
(0.00911)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs -0.0150**
(0.00344)
Other imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.00342
(0.0122)
Other imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0147
(0.0109)
Other imm. > 10 yrs -0.0195**
(0.00405)
Western Europe. imm. ≤ 5 yrs 0.0762**
(0.0210)
Western Europe. imm. 5-10 yrs 0.0137
(0.0206)
Western Europe. imm. > 10 yrs -0.00645
(0.00988)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs 0.0997**
(0.0302)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0105
(0.0247)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.00291
(0.00753)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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Table A9: The probability of claiming commuting deduction (annual income above SEK
100k; alternative classiﬁcation of birth region).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.00654
(0.00497)
Nordic Imm. -0.0227*
(0.0114)
Western Europe. Imm. -0.0378**
(0.0126)
Other Imm. 0.0235**
(0.00586)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0841**
(0.0126)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0347**
(0.0134)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0326**
(0.00565)
Other imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0739**
(0.0160)
Other imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0319
(0.0168)
Other imm. > 10 yrs 0.0502**
(0.00654)
Western Europe. imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.119**
(0.0249)
Western Europe. imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0565*
(0.0286)
Western Europe. imm. > 10 yrs 0.00806
(0.0166)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0558
(0.0334)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs -0.00964
(0.0347)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0210
(0.0130)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 85 010 85 004 84 932 84 926
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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Table A10: The probability of claiming communting deduction (Annual income above SEK
200k; alternative classiﬁcation of birth region)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.0121*
(0.00529)
Nordic Imm. -0.0152
(0.0119)
Western Europe. Imm. -0.0266*
(0.0131)
Other Imm. 0.0282**
(0.00629)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0708**
(0.0150)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0169
(0.0150)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0315**
(0.00589)
Other imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0564**
(0.0199)
Other imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0234
(0.0194)
Other imm. > 10 yrs 0.0486**
(0.00687)
Western Europe. imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.129**
(0.0278)
Western Europe. imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0188
(0.0301)
Western Europe. imm. > 10 yrs 0.0140
(0.0168)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.00678
(0.0374)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs 0.0161
(0.0368)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0209
(0.0134)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 74 133 74 132 74 061 74 060
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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Table A11: The probability of claiming commuting deduction, same workplace between years
(alternative classiﬁcation of birth region)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.0185**
(0.00601)
Nordic Imm. -0.0206
(0.0134)
Western Europe. Imm. -0.0350*
(0.0145)
Other Imm. 0.0439**
(0.00718)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0820**
(0.0190)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.00742
(0.0172)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0371**
(0.00656)
Other imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0524*
(0.0260)
Other imm. 5-10 yrs -0.00210
(0.0229)
Other imm. > 10 yrs 0.0609**
(0.00768)
Western Europe. imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.162**
(0.0335)
Western Europe. imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0283
(0.0323)
Western Europe. imm. > 10 yrs 0.0115
(0.0179)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.00693
(0.0458)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs 0.0141
(0.0421)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0254
(0.0148)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52 872 52 872 52 872 52 872
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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7.2 Robustness with respect to age and occupation controls
Table A12: The probability of taking up the commuting deduction among Stockholm and
Uppsala commuters, robustness with respect to age and occupation controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.128** -0.130** -0.111** -0.0785** -0.0780** -0.0798**
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0571** -0.0637** -0.0460** -0.0267 -0.0342* -0.0329*
(0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0356** 0.0369** 0.0432** 0.0301** 0.0275** 0.0296**
(0.00595) (0.00588) (0.00583) (0.00581) (0.00582) (0.00581)
Age linear No No No Yes Yes No
Age squared No No No No Yes No
Age dummies No No No No No Yes
Occupation dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859 77 859
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm.
Age categories are 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, and 50-64.
The included covariates are: secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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7.3 Heterogeneous take-up based on age, immigration status, and
duration of stay in the host country
Table A13: The probability of taking up the commuting deduction among Stockholm and
Uppsala commuters, heterogeneous eﬀects with respect to age and duration of stay in host
country.
(1) (2)
Deduction Deduction
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.0798** -0.211**
(0.0139) (0.0579)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs × Age 20-30 0.138*
(0.0631)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs × Age 30-40 0.160**
(0.0612)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs × Age 40-50 0.0821
(0.0669)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0329* -0.0286
(0.0144) (0.0451)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs × Age 20-30 0.0455
(0.0609)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs × Age 30-40 0.00561
(0.0492)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs × Age 40-50 -0.0497
(0.0534)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0296** 0.0206*
(0.00581) (0.00974)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs × Age 20-30 0.00495
(0.0197)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs × Age 30-40 0.0282
(0.0150)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs × Age 40-50 0.00174
(0.0146)
Age 20-30 -0.180** -0.183**
(0.00579) (0.00607)
Age 30-40 -0.105** -0.109**
(0.00445) (0.00471)
Age 40-50 -0.0401** -0.0397**
(0.00450) (0.00480)
Control variables Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
N 77 859 77 859
* and ** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Standard errors are shown in the parenthesis.
The reference group consists of native commuters between Uppsala and Stockholm aged 50-64.
The included covariates are: secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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7.4 Results for the commuting regions Södertälje–Stockholm and
Kungsbacka–Gothenburg
Here we present regression results for the commuting regions Södertälje–Stockholm and
Kungsbacka–Gothenburg.
Table A14: The probability of taking up the travel deduction among commuters between
Södertälje and Stockholm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.00408
(0.00434)
Nordic Imm. -0.0341**
(0.00832)
Europe. Imm. 0.00382
(0.00743)
Non-Europe. Imm 0.0199**
(0.00567)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.108**
(0.00877)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0238*
(0.0104)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0293**
(0.00490)
Non-Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.107**
(0.0119)
Non-Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.00522
(0.0135)
Non-Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0455**
(0.00647)
Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.107**
(0.0132)
Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0531**
(0.0173)
Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0552**
(0.00959)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.107**
(0.0289)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0357
(0.0363)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0283**
(0.00886)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 79 760 79 760 79 760 79 760
* and **denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Södertälje and Stockholm.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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Table A15: The probability of taking up the travelling deduction among commuters between
Kungsbacka and Gothenburg
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Deduction Deduction Deduction Deduction
Immigrant 0.00136
(0.00549)
Nordic Imm. -0.00841
(0.0107)
Europe. Imm. 0.0140
(0.00799)
Non-Europe. Imm -0.00981
(0.00984)
Imm. arrive ≤ 5 yrs -0.122**
(0.0154)
Imm. arrive 5-10 yrs -0.0234
(0.0151)
Imm. arrive > 10 yrs 0.0222**
(0.00621)
Non-Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.237**
(0.0288)
Non-Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0972**
(0.0293)
Non-Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0242*
(0.0108)
Europe imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0984**
(0.0208)
Europe imm. 5-10 yrs -0.0170
(0.0200)
Europe imm. > 10 yrs 0.0407**
(0.00942)
Nordic imm. ≤ 5 yrs -0.0478
(0.0342)
Nordic imm. 5-10 yrs 0.0515
(0.0346)
Nordic imm. > 10 yrs -0.0112
(0.0118)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 142 317 142 317 142 317 142 317
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errors are shown in the parenthesis.
The reference group are native commuters between Kungsbacka and Gothenburg.
The included covariates are: age, secondary school, university, female, marital status and earned income.
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8 Appendix B (Bunching analysis)
Table B1: Summary statistics for the self-employed native and immigrants, 2012-2015
Native European non-European
immigrants immigrants
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Panel A: summary statistics for the sample in the bunching analysis
Taxable income within the window [-75k, 75k]
Age 47.79 10.06 48.41 9.73 43.20 9.11
Male 0.79 0.41 0.71 0.46 0.79 0.41
Married 0.58 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.69 0.46
Primary school 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.43
Secondary School 0.52 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.49
University 0.30 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48
Incorporated business 0.61 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.37 0.48
Year since migration 26.77 14.33 21.12 9.55
Panel B: summary statistics for the sample in the regression analysis
Taxable income within the window [-10k, 10k] but outside [-5k, 5k]
Age 47.79 9.96 48.80 9.53 43.42 9.23
Male 0.80 0.40 0.71 0.45 0.79 0.41
Married 0.59 0.49 0.63 0.48 0.70 0.46
Primary school 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.43
Secondary School 0.51 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.40 0.49
University 0.31 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.48
Incorporated business 0.65 0.48 0.55 0.50 0.40 0.49
Taxable income within the window [-5k, 5k]
Age 48.07 9.89 48.77 9.54 43.29 9.00
Male 0.80 0.40 0.69 0.46 0.78 0.42
Married 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.67 0.47
Primary school 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.35 0.23 0.42
Secondary School 0.50 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49
University 0.33 0.47 0.44 0.50 0.38 0.48
Incorporated business 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.35 0.48
In Figure B1, we ﬁrst present the graphical bunching analysis for self-employed natives
and immigrants between 2002 and 2015.38 Figure B1 shows the bunching estimation with
the excess mass (coeﬃcient) and the corresponding bootstrap standard error. The his-
38In the bunching analysis, the leftmost and rightmost bin in the bunching windows relative to the bunch
point is [-5k, 5k]. The degree of polynomial is 7 and the standard error is estimated with 100 bootstraps.
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togram in dots presents the actual taxable income distribution and the solid line presents
the polynomial ﬁt to the distribution. The excess mass (coeﬃcient) is about 7.1 for self-
employed natives and about 6.1 for European immigrants. It is only about 4.3 for self-
employed non-European immigrants. In all three cases, the bootstrap standard errors are
quite small. The sensitivity checks with diﬀerent bunching windows and polynomial orders
are shown in Tables B3 and B4. Using the estimated excess mass from the bunching es-
timation, we can compute the implied taxable income elasticity according to the formula
Elasticity = B(dz)
k(1+0.3)×h0(k)×log
(
1−τ1
1−τ2
) where k is the average ﬁrst central government tax point
(in thousands, 2015 prices), τ1 is the average local tax rate and τ2 is the average central
government tax rate between 2002 and 2015. We also take the payroll tax rate into account,
which is about 30%. We set k = 381, τ1 = 0.3151, τ2 = 0.5151.
Figure B1: Bunching estimation for self-employed natives and immigrants, 2002-2015
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Table B2: Bunching and regression estimation, 2002-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[-5k, 5k] [-4k, 4k] [-3k, 3k] [-2k, 2k] [-1k, 1k]
Bunching analysis with the wider income window [-75k, 75k]
Natives
Excess mass 7.07 6.88 6.55 6.10 5.34
Standard error (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14)
Implied elasticity 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.036 0.031
non-European immigrants
Excess mass 4.30 4.17 3.94 3.68 3.28
Standard error (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.14) (0.13)
Implied elasticity 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.019
European immigrants
Excess mass 6.13 6.02 5.86 5.45 4.89
Standard error (0.24) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13)
Implied elasticity 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.032 0.029
Regression analysis with the wider income window [-10k, 10k]
Reference group: self-employed natives
Non-Europe. Imm -0.0322** -0.0381** -0.0403** -0.0443** -0.0378**
(0.00578) (0.00589) (0.00581) (0.00551) (0.00487)
Europe. Imm. -0.00864* -0.00538 -0.00506 -0.00246 -0.00497
(0.00400) (0.00411) (0.00411) (0.00398) (0.00359)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 289 227 289 227 289 227 289 227 289 227
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively in the regression analysis.
The included covariates are: age, male, marital status, secondary school and university.
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Table B3: Bunching estimation: Sensitivity with respect to size of the bunching windows,
2002-2015
Wide window Small window Natives European Non-European
(SEK) (SEK) immigrants immigrants
[-75k, 75k] [-4k, 4k] 6.88 6.02 4.17
(0.17) (0.18) (0.23)
[-75k, 75k] [-3k, 3k] 6.55 5.86 3.94
(0.17) (0.18) (0.22)
[-75k, 75k] [-2k, 2k] 6.10 5.45 3.68
(0.14) (0.18) (0.14)
[-75k, 75k] [-1k, 1k] 5.34 4.89 3.28
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
[-75k, 75k] [-5k, 2k] 6.62 5.80 3.69
(0.20) (0.21) (0.19)
[-75k, 75k] [-2k, 5k] 6.42 5.69 4.22
(0.17) (0.20) (0.23)
[-75k, 75k] [-10k, 10k] 7.34 6.22 4.38
(0.23) (0.37) (0.41)
[-75k, 75k] [-10k, 5k] 7.26 6.22 4.36
(0.25) (0.31) (0.33)
[-75k, 75k] [-5k, 10k] 6.99 6.01 4.23
(0.24) (0.27) (0.30)
[-50k, 50k] [-5k, 5k] 6.71 5.74 4.06
(0.22) (0.22) (0.29)
Bootstrap standard error is reported in parenthesis.
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Table B4: Bunching estimation: Sensitivity with respect to the polynomial degree, 2002-2015
Degree of polynomial Natives European immigrants Non-European immigrants
1 10.95 9.5 5.84
(0.42) (0.42) (0.28)
2 8.6 7.60 5.31
(0.27) (0.30) (0.29)
3 8.70 7.65 5.37
(0.26) (0.29) (0.29)
4 7.60 6.69 4.54
(0.18) (0.26) (0.24)
5 7.60 6.70 4.53
(0.18) (0.21) (0.25)
6 7.08 6.12 4.30
(0.15) (0.22) (0.27)
7 7.07 6.13 4.30
(0.16) (0.26) (0.26)
8 6.70 5.78 4.10
(0.18) (0.25) (0.28)
9 6.70 5.77 4.08
(0.19) (0.25) (0.27)
Bootstrap standard error is reported in parenthesis.
Table B5: The probability of falling into a certain bunching area, taxable income in SEK
[-10k, 20k] around the central governmental tax point, 2002-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[-5k, 5k] [-4k, 4k] [-3k, 3k] [-2k, 2k] [-1k, 1k]
Non-Europe. Imm -0.0324** -0.0359** -0.0365** -0.0384** -0.0320**
(0.00508) (0.00497) (0.00476) (0.00439) (0.00380)
Europe. Imm. -0.0104** -0.00746* -0.00675 -0.00425 -0.00547
(0.00361) (0.00357) (0.00345) (0.00326) (0.00286)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 371 597 371 597 371 597 371 597 371 597
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group is self-employed natives.
The included covariates are: age, male, marital status, secondary school and university.
54
Figure B2: Residential segregation: bunching estimation for self-employed European immi-
grants, 2002–2014
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Figure B3: Residential segregation: bunching estimation for self-employed non-European
immigrants, 2002–2014
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
Fre
qu
en
cy
-75 -65 -55 -45 -35 -25 -15 -5 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75
The parishes with low concentration of Non-European immigrants
Coefficient 6.146Standard error 0.4962Observations 9834
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
50
0
Fre
qu
en
cy
-75 -65 -55 -45 -35 -25 -15 -5 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75
The parishes with middle concentration of Non-European immigrants
Coefficient 3.757Standard error 0.3767Observations 19539
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Fre
qu
en
cy
-75 -65 -55 -45 -35 -25 -15 -5 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75
The parishes with high concentration of Non-European immigrants
Coefficient 3.203Standard error 0.399Observations 9787
0
10
00
02
00
00
30
00
04
00
00
50
00
0
Fre
qu
en
cy
-75 -65 -55 -45 -35 -25 -15 -5 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75
Natives
Coefficient 6.982Standard Error 0.1787Observations 1146914
55
Table B6: Residential segregation: The probability of falling into a certain small bunching
window, taxable income in SEK [-10k, 10k] around the ﬁrst central governmental tax point,
2002-2014.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
[-5k, 5k] [-5k, 5k] [-4k, 4k] [-3k, 3k] [-2k, 2k] [-1k, 1k]
Non-Europe. Imm -0.0306**
(0.00616)
Europe. Imm. -0.00626
(0.00418)
non-European immigrants
Low concentration 0.0102 0.00189 -0.00778 -0.00616 -0.00649
(0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0119) (0.0106)
Medium concentration -0.0486** -0.0520** -0.0505** -0.0509** -0.0415**
(0.00862) (0.00873) (0.00857) (0.00810) (0.00713)
High concentration -0.0358** -0.0370** -0.0354** -0.0432** -0.0429**
(0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0127) (0.0118) (0.0102)
European immigrants
Low concentration -0.00787 -0.00900 -0.00462 -0.00799 -0.00868
(0.00791) (0.00816) (0.00819) (0.00794) (0.00716)
Medium concentration -0.00578 0.000271 -0.00168 0.00121 -0.00412
(0.00584) (0.00600) (0.00600) (0.00581) (0.00520)
High concentration -0.00587 -0.00512 -0.00646 0.00158 0.00120
(0.00860) (0.00882) (0.00877) (0.00845) (0.00759)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 267 027 267 027 267 027 267 027 267 027 267 027
* and ** denote the signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errrors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group is self-employed natives.
The included covariates are: age, male, marital status, secondary school and university.
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Table B7: The probability of falling into a certain small bunching window for self-employed
people with incorporated business, taxable income in SEK [-10k, 10k] around the central
governmental kink point, 2002-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[-5k, 5k] [-4k, 4k] [-3k, 3k] [-2k, 2k] [-1k, 1k]
Non-European Immigrants -0.0305** -0.0383** -0.0368** -0.0356** -0.0277**
(0.00945) (0.00951) (0.00924) (0.00862) (0.00741)
European Immigrants -0.00466 -0.00286 -0.00306 -0.000859 -0.00550
(0.00580) (0.00588) (0.00577) (0.00546) (0.00469)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 160 520 160 520 160 520 160 520 160 520
* and ** denote signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group is self-employed natives.
The included covariates are: age, male, marital status, secondary school and university.
Table B8: The probability of falling into a certain small bunching window for self-employed
people with unincorporated business, taxable income in SEK [-10k, 10k] around the central
governmental kink point, 2002-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[-5k, 5k] [-4k, 4k] [-3k, 3k] [-2k, 2k] [-1k, 1k]
Non-European Immigrants -0.0794** -0.0908** -0.0997** -0.107** -0.0970**
(0.00737) (0.00758) (0.00756) (0.00726) (0.00653)
European Immigrants -0.0323** -0.0307** -0.0320** -0.0288** -0.0277**
(0.00549) (0.00571) (0.00582) (0.00574) (0.00536)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 128 707 128 707 128 707 128 707 128 707
* and ** denote signiﬁcance on the 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
The reference group is self-employed natives.
The included covariates are: age, male, marital status, secondary school and university.
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Figure B4: Bunching estimation for self-employed with incorporated business, 2002-2015
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Figure B5: Bunching estimation for self-employed with unincorporated business, 2002-2015
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9 Appendix C
Figure C1: Late tax ﬁlings, 2002–2015
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In the figure, the reference groups are natives, low income natives, middle income natives and high income natives repsectively.
Figure C2: Tax non-compliance, 2002–2015
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In the figure, the reference groups are natives, low income natives, middle income natives and high income natives respectively.
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Figure C3: The probability of not actively participating the tax declaration, 2002–2015
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In the figure, the reference group is always natives.The size of standard error is very small compared with the estimated coefficient. Therefore, they are not shown in the figure.
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